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ABSTRACT 
 
There are serious challenges facing the International Criminal Court (ICC).  
Two of these hindrances are that: firstly, the ICC has been accused of only 
targeting the African continent; and secondly, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) has no   enforcement mechanism 
against the state parties who refuse to cooperate with the court.  In light of 
these challenges, the question is whether the ICC would be able to meet the 
expectations of the international community. The significance of this study is to 
contribute to the effort of making the ICC an independent, credible and 
effective tribunal to end impunity for those who commit heinous crimes.  This 
paper seeks to assess the work and progress of the ICC since its inception in 
2002.  To achieve this, the paper will focus on the causes of non-
implementation of pending warrants of arrest and attempt to ascertain whether 
the aforesaid warrants have had effects on the conditions that lead to: the 
investigations by the ICC; the cases before the court which have, in my view, 
compromised the integrity and autonomy of the ICC because of, inter alia, its 
selective geographical prosecutions; convictions made by the court (if any); 
the pillar of the ICC, namely cooperation from member States to the Rome 
Statute that seems to be lacking; the future relationship between the African 
Union and the ICC given the current tension between the two institutions; the 
recent developments on the definition of the crime of aggression as a success 
in pre-empting States from occupying other States outside the permissible 
grounds under the Charter of the United Nations; and views on the proposed 
introduction of the oversight mechanism for the ICC and recommendations on 
how to improve the effectiveness of the Court. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
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Three hundred thousand people have been killed in Darfur, Sudan since 
2003.174  Conflicts in other parts of the world including the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Colombia, continue to claim more 
innocent lives.  Kenneth Roth opined the inability of the international 
community to punish perpetrators of heinous crimes as follows: 
The cause of this century’s brutality is not simply the evil 
that lies in some men’s hearts. It is our [collective] failure to 
build on the Nuremberg precedent by ensuring that all such 
killers are brought to justice. Too often since the Holocaust, 
the cries of the victims have gone unanswered. . . . Too many 
others responsible for the atrocities of this century continue 
to enjoy impunity.175 
 
Kenneth Roth’s assessment of the situation then is relevant even today: some 
of the perpetrators indicted by the ICC for heartless crimes are walking freely, 
including President Omar Hassan Al Bashir.176  In other cases, the warrants of 
arrest have become stale.177  What does this signify to the victims, and will the 
ICC be able to live to the expectations of the international community by 
punishing those responsible for crimes that “shock the conscience of 
humanity”?178  The inability or delay of any judicial institution to deliver 
justice is a grave concern for those who look to the courts as the proper body to 
bring justice. 
It is against this background that the drafters of the Rome Statute 
foresaw a need to incorporate a provision for review of the Statute after seven 
years of operation, in order to address these concerns.179  The first Review 
Conference was held in Kampala, Uganda on May 31, 2010 to reflect on eight 
years of the ICC’s existence and to attend to outstanding issues such as the 
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School, Centre for Civil and Human Rights, USA (expected May 22, 2011), LL.B. & Dip. in 
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phookor@gmail.com. I am grateful to the editors, Matilda EK Lasseko-Phooko and Benard 
Akang’o for comments. 
174 UN News Centre, Fresh Clashes in Darfur Kill Dozens of Civilians, UN-African Union 
Mission Reports, Sept. 7, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=35847&Cr=darfur&Cr= darfur&Cr1. 
175 Kenneth Roth, Endorse the International Criminal Court, in 3 TOWARD AN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 19 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 1999). 
176 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of Arrest 
(Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.   
177 Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct., 64th Sess. Aug. 1, 2008-July 31, 2009, ¶¶ 23-24, U.N. Doc. 
A/64/356 (Sept. 17, 2009), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 
C3FF0A887709D69E4925765D000A45E5-Full_Report.pdf. 
178 M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogen and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996).  
179 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 123, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf. 183/9 (hereinafter, Rome Statute). 
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crime of aggression on the Rome Statute.180  In his opening address, the 
President of the Assembly of State Parties, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, 
boldly articulated that the international community is “looking at a functioning 
judicial institution that had eluded [it] for decades.”181  He stated that the 
conference “will take stock both of the achievements to this day and of the 
challenges ahead”.182  Little did he know that his ambitions for a successful 
permanent international criminal court would become a reality when the 
delegates at the end of the symposium reached consensus on the definition of 
the crime of aggression.183  The crime of aggression, and its jurisdiction, has 
been a subject of a vigorous debate for centuries because there was no 
agreement on its meaning.184  Even its inclusion in Article 3 of the Rome 
Statute did not have significance because it was non-operational.185  It was 
only on February 13, 2009 that the Special Working Group on Crime of 
Aggression proclaimed that it had reached an agreement on a draft definition 
of the crime of aggression, breaking five years of deliberation.186    
  The need for the creation of an independent and permanent 
international criminal tribunal to end impunity by trying those responsible for 
heinous crimes was first conceived at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.187  
This idea became a reality on July 17, 1998 when 120 countries at the UN 
Diplomatic Conference voted in favour of the Rome Statute.188  The ICC 
became operational on July 1, 2002 after the Rome Statute was ratified by 60 
countries.189  As of October 12, 2010, 114 States have ratified the Rome 
Statute.190  The court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, 
																																																								
180 Review conference of the Rome Statute, Int’l Crim. Ct., http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ ReviewConference/ (last visited November 20, 20110). 
181 Christian Wenaweser, ICC Review Conference: Opening Remarks, Int’l Crim Ct., 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-statements-
ChristianWenaweser-ENG.pdf (last visited April 12, 2011). 
182 Id.  
183 ICC-ASP/13/Res. 6, (June 10, 2011) available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions /RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf  
184 Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L. L. 71 
(2010). 
185 Art. 5(1) (d) of the Rome Statute lists the crime of aggression as one of the crimes subject 
to the ICC jurisdiction.  Art. 5(2) suspends the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
pending its definition and exercise of jurisdiction.  The only crimes that may be brought 
presently before the ICC include genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 
186Glennon, supra note 11, at 73. 
187 Shingirai Maparura, Justice for Export: Africa and the International Criminal Court, 
CONSULTANCY AFRICA INTELLIGENCE July 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=459:justice-for-export-africa-and-the-
international-criminal-court&catid=57:africa-watch-discussion-papers&Itemid=263. 
188 Melisa K. Marle, The International Criminal Court: Assessing the Jurisdictional 
Loopholes in the Rome Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 825 (1999). 
189 About the Court, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+ Court/. 
190 The State Parties to the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ ASP/states+parties/. 
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war crimes, and the crime of aggression.191  The ICC will not replace national 
courts, but it will supplement them when they are “unwilling or unable” to 
exercise jurisdiction over the world’s most wanted suspects.192 
The purpose of this discourse is to assess the work and progress of the 
ICC since its inception in 2002 to date.  The study is important because it will 
contribute towards making the ICC an independent, credible and effective 
permanent international criminal court to end impunity.  The paper will 
conclude by providing proposals to enhance the effectiveness of the ICC and 
ensure greater State cooperation with the permanent international criminal 
court.  
In Part I, I look at the pending warrants of arrest,193 the factors 
contributing to the non-implementation, and their effects on the conditions that 
lead into investigations by the ICC’s prosecutor.  I also evaluate whether the 
ICC’s targeting of low ranking officials is contributory to the non-
implementation of warrants of arrest.  
Part II assesses the development of cases of the DRC,194 Central 
African Republic (CAR),195 Sudan,196 Uganda,197 and Kenya198 before the 
court.  In particular, I contend that the ICC has made progress given the nature, 
gravity and complexity of the offences.  I also argue that the ICC has, to a 
certain extent, compromised its credibility through its use of selective 
prosecutions in Africa, and given no convictions in eight years, this situation is 
unsatisfactory. 
Part III contends that ‘cooperation from member States to the Rome 
Statute199 is the pillar of the ICC.200  Consequently, the absence or lack of 
																																																								
191 See Rome Statute, art. 5. The crime of aggression was not defined at the time when the 
Rome Statute entered into force and thus the court did not have jurisdiction. It was only on 
July 11, 2010 that the definition was agreed upon, but the actual exercise of jurisdiction is 
subject to a decision to be taken up on January 1, 2011. 
192 Jennifer J. Llewellyn, A Comment on the Complementary Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court: Adding Insult to Injury in Transitional Contexts?, 24 DALHOUSIE L.J. 192 
(2001).  See also Rome Statute Art. 1, and Art. 17(2) (3). 
193 Rep. of the ICC to the UN for 2008/09, supra note 4, at 10.  The cases are in the 
following countries: Uganda (Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic 
Ongwen), Darfur (Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb), and the 
DRC (Bosco Ntaganda). 
194 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of Arrest 
(Feb. 10, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.pdf.  
195 Id.  
196 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of 
Arrest (July 12, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf 
(President Al Bashir is charged for genocide under Article 25(3) (a) of the Rome Statute). 
197 Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest (Sept. 27, 
2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf (charges include crimes 
against humanity and war crimes). 
198 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision authorizing 
investigation (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854287.pdf 
(charges include war crimes).  
199 Cooperation with the ICC is mentioned in various provisions of the Rome Statute 
including art. 86 and art. 93. 
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support will turn the ICC into an exorbitant, but toothless, international 
criminal court situated at The Hague, Netherlands.  The article also studies the 
future relationship between the African Union (AU) and the ICC given the 
current tension between the two institutions. 
Part IV argues that the recent resolution on the definition of the crime 
of aggression is an important success in pre-empting States from occupying 
other countries outside the permissible grounds under the Charter of the United 
Nations (UN Charter).201  The article also evaluates the seven theories that 
describe the circumstances that would constitute an act of aggression and, inter 
alia, the controversy brought by the discretion given to a state party to declare 
that it does not accept jurisdiction of the ICC on the crime of aggression.202  
Part V analyzes the achievements, challenges and failures discussed in 
Parts I, II, III and IV.  It concludes by indicating whether the work of the ICC 
has been efficient or not.   Ultimately, Part V makes recommendations for 
introducing a system of state compliance to the Rome Statute in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of the ICC and ensure greater state cooperation with 
the permanent international criminal court. 
 
PART I: PENDING WARRANTS OF ARREST 
This section discusses warrants of arrest and the charges with respect to 
each country.  The absence of a police force in the ICC seems to be the main 
obstacle in implementing warrants of arrest especially when the state 
concerned is not willing to apprehend the indicted suspects.  This is one of the 
setbacks facing the court.  
 
(a) Sudan 
Sudan’s case is unique in that the referral to the ICC was made by the 
United Nations Security Council (Security Council).203  Further, Sudan has 
signed but not ratified the Rome Statute. In Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad 
																																																																																																																																																		
200 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) experienced significant difficulties in their early stages and there were doubts on 
whether they would deliver justice.  The proceedings were costly and too long; hundreds were 
charged, but only few were convicted.  The courts later on considered plea bargaining for low 
ranking officials in exchange for truth and testifying against “big fishes.”  This worked briefly 
but the court later on did not impose sentences recommended by the prosecutors.  Rather, it 
imposed harsher sentences.  The accused person did not come forward as they realized that it 
was no longer guaranteed that a confession and a plea of guilty would result in lenient 
punishment.  Currently, the tribunals are considering sending home accused low ranking 
officials to stand trial in their countries due to the pressure from the United Nations to 
complete trials by the end of 2010.  See Alex Whiting, International Criminal Prosecutions, 
Justice Delayed Can Be Justice Delivered, 50 (2) HARV. INT’L. L.J. 323 (2009). 
 
201 See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
202 See ICC Res. 6, supra note 10, at art. 15. 
203 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, To 
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8551 (Mar. 31, 2005) 
available at  http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm (last visited Apr. 9. 
2011).  See also Rome Statute, art. 13(b) (dealing with referrals by the Security Council). 
187 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 187  
Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman,204 both warrants of arrest were 
issued on May 2, 2007.  The first accused is facing forty-nine charges for 
crimes against humanity (murder of civilians in the Kodoom villages) and war 
crimes (destruction of property).205  The second accused has to answer fifty-
one similar charges which include rape.206  The perpetrators have been 
fugitives since 2007. 
In Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir207 the accused is the 
first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC.208  His warrants of arrest 
were issued on May 4, 2009 and July 12, 2010 for genocide (amputation of 
civilians and mental destruction) and crimes against humanity (torture) 
respectively.209  
The Sudanese case is also complex in that it raises the issue of state 
sovereignty. The undisputed and clear obligation in terms of the Security 
Council’s resolution is that the government of Sudan must arrest President Al 
Bashir.210  The difficult with this obligation is that on one hand, the ICC has no 
police force to arrest President Al Bashir.  President Al Bashir is the sitting 
Head of State who still has control of the police and army forces in his country.  
It is unimaginable that he would order his forces to arrest himself. 
Another difficulty is that state parties to the Rome Statute have to 
cooperate with the ICC by bringing President Al Bashir to the ICC.  However, 
they also have to respect the principle of state or diplomatic immunity of a 
person under Article 98 of the Rome Statute.211  Consequently, the conflict 
faced by states is having to comply with the ICC while also having to respect 
diplomatic immunity.  It is submitted that the principle of State sovereignty 
seems to be losing its superior status to human rights protection.  As was 
pointed out in Prosecutor v. Tadic,212 the International Criminal Tribunal for 
																																																								
204 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun & Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Case 
No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.pdf.  
205 Id.  
206 Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun & Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, 
Warrant of Arrest (Apr. 27, 2007) http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.pdf. 
207Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of 
Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.   
208 First International Arrest Warrant for Head of State Issued to Bashir Over Darfour 
[Darfur], WORLD TRIBUNE, (Mar. 5, 2009) available at 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ WTARC/2009/af_sudan0188_03_05.asp (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2011). 
209 Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Second 
Warrant of Arrest (July 12, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc907140.pdf. 
210 See ICC Res. 6, supra note 10.  
211 Rome Statute, art. 98 (1) provides that “[T]he Court may not proceed with a request for 
surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that 
third State for the waiver of the immunity.” 
212 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on Jurisdiction (Appeals Chamber), Judgment of 2 October 
1995, 105 ILR 453. 
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that “it would be a travesty of law and 
betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept of state 
sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human rights.”213  
This is further supported by the indictment of President Charles Taylor on 
March 7, 2003 while he was still a sitting Head of State.214  He was, however, 
arrested after resigning as President.215  Ultimately, the provision of Article 27 
of the Rome Statute can also be invoked justifing the indictment of President 
Al Bashir based on the principle that the law should apply equally to all of 
those accused of grave crimes. 216 
Given the current outstanding warrants of arrest, Sudan will arguably 
neither ratify the Rome Statute in the near future, nor will President Al Bashir 
authorise the arrest of his indicted commanders and himself.  President Al 
Bashir is not a fugitive because he walks freely and is seemingly innocent as 
ever.  He arguably also enjoys the lenient treatment from the African Union.  
Further, this is one of the most unfortunate cases in the African continent 
where leaders shield perpetrators regardless of the nature of the crimes 
committed.  Indeed, birds of a feather flock together.  It is contented that one 
of the reasons President Al Bashir is protected is because some of the African 
leaders are, in one way or the other, also responsible for international crimes in 
their respective countries.  The situation in Sudan remains tense and the 
victims have arguably lost faith in the justice system. 
 
(b) Uganda 
Uganda has ratified the Rome Statute and it was President Yoweri 
Museveni who referred the case to the ICC under Articles 13(a) and 14 of the 
Statute to conduct investigations.217  Consequently, five warrants of arrest were 
issued on July 8, 2005.218  After the international community had spent efforts 
to apprehend Raska Lukwiya in order to answer nine criminal charges against 
him in Prosecutor v. Raska Lukwiya,219 the accused cheated justice.220  He died 
																																																								
213 Andrea Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J.  INT’L. L. 
237, 261 (1999) (explaining that state practice and the logic of generally accepted principles 
display an inconsistency between the notion of international crimes and any form of immunity 
that shields individuals behind their official position). 
214 Prosecution v. Ghankay Taylor, SPECIAL CT. SIERRA LEONE, http://www.sc-
sl.org/CASES/ ProsecutorvsCharlesTaylor/tabid/107/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
215 Id. 
216 Rome Statute, supra note 6, at art. 27 (providing that “[T[his Statute shall apply equally 
to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity 
as [Head of State or Government] . . . in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility 
under this Statute, nor shall it, in itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.”). 
217Abigal H. Moy, The International Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrants and Uganda’s 
Lord’s Resistance Army: Renewing the Debate Over Amnesty and Complementarity, 19 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 267 (2006). 
218 Id.  
219 Prosecutor v. Raska Lukwiya, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05055, Warrant of Arrest (July 8, 
2005), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.pdf.  
189 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 189  
whilst still at large thus escaping counts of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.221  It is sad that someone who allegedly attacked civilians at the 
refugee camps died without accounting for his evil deeds.  His death has 
denied the people of Uganda justice and truth on why their loved ones were 
killed.  In Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and 
Dominic Ongwen,222 the accused are charged for war crimes (pillaging at a 
redacted IDP camp) and all remain at large since 2005. 
 
(c) DRC 
In Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda the accused is charged for war crimes 
(recruitment of child soldiers under the age of fifteen).223  He is still on the run 
from the long arm of the law since August 2006.224  Overall, there are seven 
pending warrants issued during the 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009 periods.225 
The principle of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute has arguably been compromised in the DRC and Uganda in the 
following respect: the Presidents, both in the DRC and Uganda, referred the 
cases to the ICC prosecutor to conduct investigations against rebel leaders, 
warlords and opposition leaders in the order of their ranking.  The aforesaid 
referrals should have been approached with utmost caution. They trigger 
important questions.  What about both presidents’ forces who have also 
committed atrocities?  Who is the senior commander of the army forces?  Why 
are the governments’ forces not being investigated including the Heads of 
States?   For example, towards the end of September 2009, “two thousand 
civilians were slaughtered and over seven thousand women and girls were 
raped by both rebels and government forces” in the North and East of 
Congo.226  In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has on various occasions 
																																																																																																																																																		
220 Cf. Stephanos Bibas & William Burke-White,, International Idealism Meets Domestic-
Criminal Procedure Realism, 59 DUKE L.J. 637, 639 (2010) (referring to Slobodan 
Milosevic’s sudden death before facing war crimes verdict). 
221 Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings 
Against Raska Lukwiya, ¶ 10 (July 10, 2007), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297945.pdf.  
222 Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+ and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0204/ (last visited Apr. 
23, 2011). 
223 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug. 22, 
2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.pdf. 
224 Callixte Mbarushimana arrested in France for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
allegedly committed in the Kivus (Democratic Republic of the Condo), INT’L CRIM. CT., (Oct. 
11, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20 
(2010)/pr581. 
225 See Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct., supra note 4. 
226 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2010) 
http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2010/democratic-republic-congo-drc. 
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ordered his security forces to “shoot and kill the civilians”.227  The troops are 
also implicated in the killing and torture of the civilians in the remote area of 
Karamoja as part of the “disarmament exercise.”228  These are serious crimes 
alleged to have been committed by government forces that purport to be on a 
peace keeping mission.  It is thus submitted that this one-sided investigation 
and prosecution hugely impacts on the execution of the warrants of arrest.  
Further, it is contended that the heads of state are shielding their men from the 
ICC.  Consequently, as long as it is clear that the law is targeting select 
individuals, it will be difficult to execute warrants of arrest and bring all 
perpetrators to justice regardless of their official capacities.  
The situation in the DRC and Uganda illustrates a clear case for 
impunity of Heads of State, prosecution of selective “small fishes” and 
disregard of equality before the law.  Accordingly, Presidents Joseph Kabila 
and Yoweri Museveni and their army officials should also be investigated 
under the doctrine of command responsibility.229  
The Sudanese situation truly reflects the objectives of the ICC because 
the warrants of arrest have been issued against everyone who is suspected of 
committing heinous crimes regardless of their office or rebel or political 
affiliation.  The suspects are still at large and changing their hiding places in 
search of “save heavens [sic].”230  The Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) is said to be heavily recruiting soldiers in remote areas of central 
Africa.231 
 
PART II: CASES BEFORE THE COURT  
There are currently four cases before the ICC referred by state parties 
to the Rome Statute.  However, the proceedings have experienced delays 
because all of the accused are doing everything possible to prove their alleged 
innocence. 
  
(a) DRC 
In Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubango case), Mr. Lubango 
a Congolese national, is charged for war crimes that include enlisting children 
																																																								
227 Yoweri Museveni Orders Guards to Shoot and Kill Youth, FREE UGANDA, Mar. 17, 2010, 
http://freeuganda.wordpress.com/2010/03/17/ugandayoweri-museveni-orders-guards-to-shoot-
and-kill-youth. 
228 Uganda Army Accused of Karamoja Torture Abuses, BBC NEWS AFRICA, Aug. 17, 2010, 
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under the age of fifteen and using them to actively participate in hostilities.232  
He is alleged to be the founder and president of the Unions patriots congolais 
(UPC) and Commander in Chief of its military wing, the Forces patriotiques 
pour la liberation du Congo (FPLC).233  Mr. Lubanga is allegedly responsible 
as a co-perpetrator of the aforesaid crimes.234  The case experienced numerous 
delays because of Mr Lubanga’s challenge that a fair trial was not possible 
because the prosecution did not disclose certain evidence to his defence and 
the court.235  The trial chamber I upheld his challenge and stayed the 
proceedings in June 2008.236  After being operational for seven years without a 
single trial, January 26, 2009 marked the start of the first ever trial before the 
ICC.237  The prosecution presented its evidence from January until July 14, 
2009.238  It tendered 199 items of evidence and thirty witnesses testified before 
the court.239  The defence started its case in October 2009.240  The case started 
three years after Mr Lubanga’s arrest in March 2006.241  The commencement 
of the first trial is arguably a huge step towards the creation of the court’s 
jurisprudence. 
  In Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui242 the 
accused allegedly jointly committed war crimes and crimes against humanity 
which include sexual slavery, rape and attack of civilians, murder and 
destruction of the enemy’s property through other persons, within the meaning 
of Article 23, 3(a)243 of the Rome Statute.244  The pre-trial chamber confirmed 
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the charges on September 26, 2008 the ICC and the parties commenced 
preparations for the trial.245  This includes the disclosure of evidence, and the 
protection of witnesses and information.  Mr. Katanga challenged the 
admissibility of the case against him on the basis that he was already 
prosecuted for similar offences in his country.246  The court held a public 
hearing on the challenge and all the parties to the case participated.247  His 
contention was dismissed on the basis that there was no case opened against 
him in the DRC.248  He appealed the decision.249  Mr. Katanga was turned over 
to the ICC on October 17, 2007 and Mr. Chui on February 6, 2008.250  Their 
trials commenced on November 24, 2009.251  
 
(b) Central African Republic 
In Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo the accused was arrested 
on May 24, 2008 and charged as a co-perpetrator of war crimes (murder, 
torture, rape and pillage) and crimes against humanity (murder and rape).252  
The pre-trial chamber II started a hearing to confirm the charges on January 
12, 2009 but the matter was adjourned.253  The chamber asked the prosecutor 
to consider amending the charges on the basis that the facts of the case were 
more likely to establish a different form of criminal responsibility (command 
responsibility).254  It confirmed the charges on June 15, 2009 but declined to 
confirm torture as a war crime.255  The prosecutor appealed the chamber’s 
unfavourable ruling on June 22, 2009.  Mr. Gombo’s trial commenced eight 
months later.256 
 
(c) Sudan 
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In Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda the accused was summoned on 
May 17, 2009 to appear before the ICC for allegations that he is responsible as 
a rebel commander for crimes committed against AU Peace-keepers in 
Haskanita, Darfur.257  His first appearance was on May 18, 2009.258  The 
hearing for confirmation of charges took place on October 19, 2009.259 The 
ICC has declined to confirm the charges against the accused and subsequent 
appeals by the prosecutor have also been unsuccessful.260  
A general view has emerged within the international community that 
war crime tribunals have been “too slow to investigate, charge and prosecute” 
offenders.261  In Alex Whiting’s words: 
Delays in bringing perpetrators to justice can diminish the 
deterrent value of such prosecutions, undermine the quality of 
the evidence in the case, allow perpetrators to continue living in 
impunity and continue committing crimes, discourage and 
marginalize the victims, and lead to a squandering of the 
world’s interests and attention which will, in time, be diverted 
to other crises.262  
 
Indeed, the fact that there have been no convictions since the ICC’s conception 
seven years ago, coupled with the delays in the commencement of trials, may 
appear unsatisfactory. However, these delays should be looked at objectively 
by taking into account all the factors that sometimes affect a trial rather than 
simply advocating for speeding up trials. Ignoring essential rights such as due 
process and the right to challenge evidence and procedural issues can 
potentially compromise the credibility of the proceedings. For example, 
Saddam Hussein’s rushed trial and execution for crimes against humanity was 
labeled as being “flawed and unsound.”263 Further, the protection of all parties 
to a trial has to be guaranteed, including witnesses and victims, to preempt a 
situation such as that in Iraq where three defense attorneys were assassinated in 
Saddam’s case.264 This is a clear example of a sham proceeding. The Lubanga 
case was delayed, inter alia, because the prosecutor failed to disclose certain 
evidence to the defense. The ICTY in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski articulated that 
“both parties must be given equal opportunity in relation to the evidence 
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tendered by the other.”265 Accordingly, the accused person in the Lubanga case 
had a right to challenge the proceedings in order to vindicate his fair trial 
rights. It is thus submitted that the delays, such as the one in the Lubanga case, 
are unavoidable in a system that is cognisant of, inter alia, fair trial rights and 
the legitimacy of the proceedings.  
Other problems or inescapable delays can also be caused by the gravity 
and complexity of the war crimes themselves.266 Prosecution of war crimes is 
also a “project in its infancy.”267 This view does not suggest that all delays are 
unavoidable or unreasonable. Therefore, there is a need to treat each case 
based on its facts and merits. According to Alex Whiting, “in war crimes cases, 
delay can be essential for allowing the truth to emerge . . . [and thus] the goal 
should be to determine whether justice requires expediency, some degree of 
delay or the balance of the two.”268 This view is supported because these 
crimes often occur in times of conflict and in most cases criminal justice is 
often non-existent and/or not independent after the war. Further, even after the 
war, it is difficult to conduct quick investigations where perpetrators (i.e., the 
Sudanese conflict) are still in power. For example, investigators have struggled 
to gain access in Sudan and they have relied on witnesses who are outside of 
the country.269 It is also difficult to prove mass crimes when “the very 
existence of the crimes is denied by the accused and establishing the link 
between the crimes and perpetrators can be an enormous undertaking,” largely 
because the accused, in a high-level positions, are generally not direct 
participants in the crimes.270 This is the position taken by the accused persons 
before the ICC. They have all entered a plea of not guilty and claim that they 
are innocent. 
Though the prosecution usually begins by trying small fish, the 
ultimate goal of war crimes prosecutors is to “bring to justice the highest-level 
commanders responsible for the commission of the crimes.”271  
The ICC’s one-sided focus on the African continent is troubling and is 
a grave concern for the credibility and independence of the court. The ICC’s 
focus on Africa has been dubbed as “pursuing its own brand of justice.”272 As 
discussed earlier, regardless of referrals from the state parties, the ICC should 
have foreseen the dangers of indicting African leaders given the historical 
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political clouds that have surrounded previous international criminal 
tribunals.273 Accordingly, the ICC has tarnished its own legitimacy. 
In light of the above, the international community’s expectations 
should be realistic and not demand quick action in isolation of the unavoidable 
circumstances of each case nor disregard that the accused person also has the 
right to a fair trial including the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. 
Further, justice should not be measured by the number of convictions but by 
the legitimacy of the proceedings from investigation until sentencing. The 
court is functioning, investigations are underway and three trials have 
commenced. 
 
PART III: COOPERATION OF STATE PARTIES WITH THE ICC 
Expressing the difficulties associated with executing arrest warrants, 
then judge of the ICTY McDonald opined that, “[w]hen we issue an arrest 
warrant, it’s just disregarded.”274 This indicates that an international court is 
largely dependant on state cooperation. The ICTY had then handed down 
seventy-seven indictments but only ten suspects were in custody.275 
The ICC has no police force, inter alia, to execute warrants of arrest 
issued by it.276 This is a clear illustration that the efficiency of the ICC is 
largely dependent on state cooperation and the international community. It is 
inconceivable that the prosecutor of the court would enter a sovereign state 
without approval from said country to conduct his investigations. Speaking for 
the ITCR and ICTY, Dagmar Stroh said that “the courts were fully functional 
after overcoming several initial problems [sic]” but highlighted that 
cooperation of states remains an “indispensable requirement for efficient 
proceedings.”277 Indeed, the ICC’s work depends primarily on the support of 
member states and non-state parties (when requested by the Security Council 
or the ICC) to function expeditiously.278 The obligations to cooperate with the 
court are listed in various provisions of the Rome Statute including Article 86 
that in part provides:  
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court279. 
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In light of the binding nature of the aforesaid provision, state parties are 
obliged to assist the ICC with any support that it has sought. Cooperation with 
the ICC includes provisional arrest, and the identification of the whereabouts 
of the suspects.280 It is unfortunate that the AU has urged its members (who are 
also parties to the Rome Statute) not to cooperate with the court in executing 
warrants of arrest and surrendering of President Al Bashir.281 Consequently, 
the court is unable to apprehend the Sudanese and other suspects in the African 
region. It is thus evident that without the members states support, the ICC 
would be toothless. 
 
Security Council referrals affect the ICC 
 
The Security Council bears the primary responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and stability.282 It has discretionary powers under Chapter 
VII to, inter alia, determine the existence of threat to any peace,283 and decide 
what measures to take without use of force in order to implement its decisions 
and making referrals to the ICC.284 
The Security Council’s referrals are arguably problematic because a 
state that has not ratified the Rome Statute is able to participate and vote in the 
Security Council’s meetings regarding a matter that is to be referred to the 
ICC. The Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII provisions of the UN 
Charter referred the case of Sudan to the ICC in 2005 and “urged all member 
States and non-member States to the Rome Statute to cooperate fully” with the 
court.285 Support has not been forthcoming. Despite several difficulties that the 
prosecutor of the ICC has brought to the attention of the Security Council 
about having no access to Sudan, the Security Council has not engaged any 
approach that has resulted in the arrest of the suspects.286  
The Security Council has so far only made referrals to the ICC but has 
never taken any tough follow-up steps to enforce compliance with the ICC.287 
There is arguably less progress on cases (with the exception of Lubanga case 
which is on trial) referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Elizabeth 
Minogue suggests that the Security Council “could invoke its Chapter VII 
authority to order forces to cooperate with and assist an international court in 
any way possible” such as ordering the forces deployed in Sudan to search for 
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indictees or aid the prosecutor with his investigations.”288 This proposition is 
only supported to the extent that the Security Council should further attempt to 
enforce compliance with the ICC’s requests for international support. This 
could be in a form of diplomatic isolations with any state that refuses to arrest 
and surrender suspects to the ICC. The proposition that deployed forces should 
assist with carrying out investigations is not supported. Soldiers are generally 
not experts on carrying out investigations. The nature of the crimes allegedly 
committed requires skill. Lack or absence of expertise may negatively affect 
the gathering of evidence. Conducting investigations might be a too heavy a 
burden on deployed forces that are expected to bring stability. 
 
AU and the ICC 
 
There have been mixed reactions regarding the ICC and its intervention 
in Africa, it has been labelled as a “tool of imperialists pursuing its own brand 
of justice at the cost of enflaming war and disregarding the interests of 
victims.”289 This presumably suggests that the ICC is a foreign Court that was 
created for only prosecuting Africa. The AU has publicly urged its members 
not to cooperate with the ICC’s regarding the arrest of President Al Bashir, in 
Sudan.290 The basis for such attacks on the ICC and refusal to cooperate with it 
need to be assessed. There is no doubt that atrocities are being committed in 
the Africa. The attacks thus should not be on the ICC’s involvement in Africa, 
but rather to encourage it to expand its scope of focus beyond Africa and to 
other regions where atrocities are also committed.  
International case law291 has confirmed that genocide and crimes 
against humanity are violations of jus cogens norms – “overriding norms” that 
prevail over any other norms.292 These norms also entail erga omnes duties of 
states that are obligations not only owed to victims but to all states and the 
international community as well.293 Accordingly, all states have a clear 
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obligation that is owed to the international community to prohibit atrocities 
including arresting President Al Bashir and surrendering him to the ICC. The 
AU seems to be relying on the impunity provisions accorded to heads of states 
under Article 98 of the Rome Statute to justify its refusal to cooperate with the 
ICC.294 It is submitted that the AU’s reliance under Article 98 of the Rome 
Statute as erroneous because all members of the United Nations have an 
obligation to abide by the decisions of the Security Council.295 Further, the AU 
seems to be contending that as much as Chad and Kenya (both state parties to 
the Rome Statute and members of the AU) are AU members that are obliged 
under the UN Charter to adhere to the United Nations resolutions, they are also 
bound to comply with the decisions of the AU arising from Article 23 (2) of 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union which imposes sanctions on member 
states who fail to comply with the decisions and policies of the AU.296 This 
argument is also mistaken because it fails to acknowledge that when there is a 
conflict of between the UN Charter and other international agreements, the 
obligations flowing from the UN Charter prevail.297 As was found by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States 
of America that “members of the United Nations are obliged to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council . . . the obligations of the Parties 
in that respect prevail over their obligations under any other international 
agreement, including the Montreal Convention.”298 
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As things stands, it appears that the discussions about the establishment 
of the African Court of Justice on Human Rights (ACJ) will slowly but surely 
gain momentum.299  The ACJ is to exercise jurisdiction over international 
crimes committed on the African continent.300 The danger with the ACJ is that 
individuals and non-governmental organizations will not be able to bring 
complaints directly to the court but will have to do so via the AU.301 The 
accessibility is thus made unreasonably difficult. The move to create the ACJ 
is arguably going to shield those who have committed atrocities from being 
apprehended and handed over to the ICC. The reason for this is, in my view, 
that the AU has been too lenient and slow to act against those who commit 
gross violations of human rights in the region. Should the ACJ come into 
existence, it remains unclear on what will happen to the African countries that 
have ratified the Rome Statute because there will be two tribunals with 
jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes. It is also doubtful 
whether the AU will act against President Al Bashir and other suspects as it 
has done nothing so far to assist the ICC with executing warrants of arrest. The 
ACJ will thus be dependent on the political will of AU members to prosecute 
those who commit atrocities.  
Part IV: Resolution on the Crime of Aggression: Two Steps Forward, 
Three Steps Back 
The Rome Statute was not a first attempt to define the crime of 
aggression, the efforts started in 1919 after World War I, in an attempt to 
prosecute German Kaizer Willem II for “a supreme offence against 
international morality and sanctity of treaties.”302 Mr. Willem found refuge in 
the Netherlands and requests for his extradition were turned down.303 The 
efforts to try him thus failed.304 Crime of aggression was also recognised in the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the Nuremberg Trials) as having 
been codified in 1923 in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance (TMA).305 The 
TMA proclaimed that “aggressive war [was] an international crime,” and that 
“the parties would undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its 
commission.”306 The accused persons at the Nuremberg Trials were charged, 
inter alia, for crimes against peace that was defined as “planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
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international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”307 Twelve 
accused were convicted.308 This was the first time that the crime of aggression 
was successfully prosecuted but the trials thereafter were labelled as 
“unprincipled” because of, inter alia, the ambiguity of the offences.309 The 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East also tried and convicted 
twenty-three accused persons for having committed the crime of aggression.310 
Despite the convictions in both the aforesaid trials, the tribunals did not define 
the crime of aggression.311 The United Nations General Assembly three 
attempts to define the crime of aggression were unsuccessful.312  It was only on 
July 11, 2010, when the international community reached a consensus on the 
definition of the crime of aggression in Kampala, Uganda.313   
This is a big development towards pre-empting states from invading 
other countries outside the permissible grounds, such as the right of individual 
or collective self-defense against an armed attack, set forth in the UN 
Charter.314 Acts of aggression that have arguably been committed include the 
contentious invasion of Iraq by the United States of America in 2003. 
However, nothing could be done to bring the perpetrators of the crime of 
aggression before the ICC pending an international agreement on the definition 
and the elements of the crime. 
 The new definition provides a detailed attempt to highlight 
circumstances under which the crime of aggression can be committed, but is 
not immune from criticisms for, inter alia, being too broad. Article 8 bis of the 
amendment to the Rome Statute defines the crime of aggression as follows: 
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means 
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in 
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
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other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration 
of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, 
qualify as an act of aggression: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State 
or part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the 
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State 
against the territory of another State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed 
forces of another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or 
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the 
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving 
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has 
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other 
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.315 
 
The above definition arguably reflects developments from the criminal charges 
instituted against the accused persons at the Nuremberg Trials. The present 
definition is to a large extent more precise in that it provides various 
circumstances under which an act of aggression can be committed. It also 
appears from the definition that the crime of aggression can only be committed 
by a state and not a non-state actor such as mercenaries.316  
Michael Glennon’s concerns on the draft definition of crime of 
aggression adopted by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
in 2009 seems to have not been addressed despite the fact that there has been a 
consensus on the definition.317 According to him:  
“[p]reparation for armed conflict armed conflict engages more 
than military and defense ministry personnel. Intelligence 
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agencies provide a wide variety of information to defence 
planners that advance military objectives . . . . Lawyers advise 
policy makers what use of force is lawful. Who among them 
incurs criminal liability for planning or preparing the crime of 
aggression? Where is the line drawn?”318  
 
This view is supported. It would arguably be difficult to determine who should 
bear the greatest criminal liability for the planning or preparing of acts that 
constitute the crime of aggression. Another difficulty is that Article 8(1) bis, 
inter alia, requires that the preparation and planning of an act of aggression be 
manifest in its character and gravity of scale. These terms are not defined; 
there are no guidelines on what precisely is meant by manifest and gravity of 
scale and which factors need to be taken into account to ascertain manifest and 
gravity of scale. They are thus open to debate and various interpretations can 
be applied. A defendant would arguably face an unknown and difficult case 
because the aforesaid undefined terms, in my view, still needs to be dissected. 
The prosecution will also have a difficult task of proving conduct that qualifies 
as “an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations” under Article 8(1) 
above. 
Article 8(2) bis further provide seven theories (a-g) under which an act 
of aggression may be committed. The relevant parts which were absent from 
the criminal charges at the Nuremberg Trials  are subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) 
that list acts that would qualify as an act of aggression;  
“(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any 
annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State 
or part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the 
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State 
against the territory of another State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed 
forces of another State . . . .”319 
 
The above three theories are noticeable developments from the Nuremberg 
Trials because they extend the circumstances under which an act of aggression 
can be committed. Despite these developments, there are other concerns. 
Firstly, there is no clarity about the number of victims that have to be 
injured/present by the state allegedly committing an act of aggression under 
subparagraph (b) (i.e., bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the 
territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the 
territory of another State). Secondly, the attack by the armed forces in 
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subparagraph (d) (i.e., an attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea 
or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State) is silent on whether 
material support, such as financing armed forces, to attack on the land of 
another state would also qualify an act of aggression. There are no guidelines 
regarding the factors which need to be considered in assessing what constitutes 
substantial involvement under subparagraph (g) (i.e. the sending by, or on 
behalf of, a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which 
carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein). Would the 
sending of only ten mercenaries or armed groups constitute substantial 
involvement and thereby qualify as an act of aggression? How would the 
mercenaries be linked to a particular state because they are presumably not 
easily recognised and their employer, is unknown? These are just some of the 
issues that will perhaps be a subject of litigation and prove difficult to provide 
a precise meaning for.  
In considering the accomplishments of the ICC and the crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statue, the resolution on a definition of the crime of 
aggression represents a step in the right direction. However, the terms that 
have been used in the provision are a clear indication that the agreement is a 
product of prolonged negotiations and compromise. This significantly takes 
away from the accomplishment. With the ICC struggling with the practical 
implementation of seemingly clear provisions in the Rome Statute, the 
inclusion of an overly broad provision does not do much to assist it. These are 
some of the challenges surrounding the new definition. In a tongue in cheek 
manner, academics have welcomed the Review Conference for having 
produced “complicated and incoherent provisions” that will assist them in 
writing journal articles.320  
 
Jurisdiction  
Article 15 bis concerns the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.321 However, the problem with the jurisdiction provision is that the 
state party to the Rome Statute would have an option to make a declaration to 
the effect that it does not accept the court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression. Kevin Jon Heller is of the view that the factors surrounding the 
exercise of jurisdiction make it hard to believe that “any significant act of 
aggression will ever be prosecuted.”322 In developing his assessment, he 
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favorably summarises the provision of jurisdiction (or what he refers to as opt-
out (OO) clause) as follows:  
 State Party & State Party  Jurisdiction 
 State Party & State Party OO  Jurisdiction 
 State Party & Non-State Party  No Jurisdiction 
 State Party OO & State Party  No Jurisdiction 
 State Party OO & State Party OO  No Jurisdiction 
 State Party OO & Non-State Party  No Jurisdiction 
 Non-State Party & State Party  No Jurisdiction 
 Non-State Party & State Party OO No Jurisdiction 
 Non-State Party & Non-State Party No Jurisdiction.323 
The summary shows that the ICC will have jurisdiction on a state party that 
commits an act of aggression against another state party and vice versa. This 
would apply if both states parties have not made a declaration exempting them 
from the court’s jurisdiction. A state party that commits an act of aggression 
against the state party that has made a declaration not to accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction will be prosecuted.324 Where a state party that has declared not to 
accept the ICC’s jurisdiction commits an act of aggression against a state party, 
the ICC will have no jurisdiction.325 Where a non-state party commits an act of 
aggression against state party that has made a declaration not to accept the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, the court will not prosecute vice versa.  
This is an indication that the jurisdiction clause was highly debated. For 
example, some of the delegates at the Kampala Conference made a proposal 
“aimed at divorcing draft Article 8 bis from customary international criminal 
law and purported to explicitly exclude certain instances of state use of force 
from the definition of the crime of aggression.”326 There was nonetheless no 
agreement.327 The option not to accept jurisdiction arguably renders the 
prosecution for aggression redundant. For example, a state may decide to ratify 
the Rome Statute but make a reservation on the crime of aggression 
jurisdiction thus shielding its leaders from prosecution. It is unfortunate that 
even if a state has ratified the Rome Statute, it would still have an option not to 
accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of aggression. Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that there will be a prosecution brought for the crime of 
aggression in the near future. 
Given the complexity of the crime of aggression and the fact that some 
states (for example the United States of America in Afghanistan and Iraq) are 
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still at war with other countries, this was arguably the best compromise that 
was possible. These are nonetheless achievements.  
 
PART V: OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
There are many achievements that the international community can 
reflect on since 2002. But, there are challenges remain. Today, the 
international community speaks of an existing and functioning, permanent 
international criminal court. Three complex trials are underway including that 
of recruiting child soldiers to take part in the war in DRC. The French 
authorities recently arrested a Congolese national, Mr. Callixte Mbarushimana 
and handed him over to the ICC to answer charges of crimes against humanity 
(murder, torture, rape and persecution) and war crimes (attacks against the 
civilian population). The confirmation of charges hearing against six Kenyan 
suspects is scheduled for September 2011.328 Despite an absolute lack of 
cooperation from the Sudanese government, the prosecutor has managed to 
conduct and gather information from various Sudanese people who are outside 
of the country. Further, investigations are underway in, inter alia, DRC, 
Uganda, Libya and CRA. In Uganda, the ICC’s intervention has forged room 
for peace talks with the rebels.329 The prosecutor is also monitoring the 
situation in Colombia, Georgia, Chad, Afghanistan and Nigeria.330 The 
Security Council recently referred the situation in Libya for investigations of 
crimes against humanity.331 The ICC’s involvement in Ivory Coast prior the 
2010 conflict did decrease violence.332  
The office of the prosecutor has adopted a thematic approach by 
prosecuting one particular crime.333 The advantage of this method is that as 
these crimes are addressed, the law develops in those specific areas and this 
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generates significant public awareness concerning those crimes, and, the 
defence can face a specific case.334 However, the problem with thematic 
prosecution is that victims of other crimes, such as genocide, are left out.335 In 
other words, justice for them would not be done because the accused person 
would only be prosecuted for war crimes.  
Another challenge is that the victims have insufficient knowledge about 
the ICC. A population-based survey on attitudes about accountability and 
social reconstruction in the CAR revealed, inter alia, the following; 
(a) 23% of victims believed that the ICC had been established by the 
European community; 
(b) 65% of those who knew about the ICC believed that it has its offices in 
CAR and that the court could investigate offences committed prior to 
2002.336 
 
The lack of knowledge creates unnecessary and unrealistic expectations from 
the court and also disappoints the victims. Further, it also creates doubts about 
the court’s efficacy. 
The fact that it has secured no convictions in eight years of existence 
can easily lead to an unjust conclusion that the ICC has failed. Indeed, a court 
of law is expected to deliver justice without delay. This is nonetheless a 
challenge that cannot be ignored. Like any other judicial body, the ICC also 
has its shortfalls. All the current cases before the Court are only from Africa, 
despite the fact that atrocities falling within the court’s jurisdiction are also 
committed elsewhere. The ICC’s target seems to be ‘small fish’ such as rebels, 
warlords and opposition leaders,337 with the exception of Sudan where 
President Al Bhashir has been indicted. Arrest warrants have been pending for 
too long. There is no cooperation with the court. In fact, the AU has openly 
declared that it will not support the court and has also urged its members and 
friends of Africa not to cooperate with it.338  
The delay in executing warrants of arrest has been caused by lack of 
cooperation from state and non-state parties. With regard to the late 
commencement of trials, there is nothing that the court could have done 
because the defence team has a right to challenge the evidence brought against 
the accused person. Therefore, any attempts by the ICC to unreasonably deny 
the accused person the exercise of his due process rights (i.e. to challenge 
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evidence) would have arguably compromised the legitimacy of the 
proceedings. Further, the crimes before the ICC including war crimes, are 
complex and there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach. As observed by Alex 
Whiting, “[t]he expectations of the international community when constructing 
war crimes tribunals are critically important, especially since the prosecution 
of war crimes is still a project in its infancy.”339 This view is supported. The 
international community should be aware that international criminal tribunals 
are relatively new. In particular, the ICC is still in its early stages. Therefore, 
the delays are also caused by the gravity and complexity of the offences. The 
ICC should thus be given a reasonable opportunity to function and then be 
evaluated. The consensus on the crime of aggression is a success, although the 
definition has broad terms. The option available to states not to accept the 
ICC’s jurisdiction seems like it will be the only factor making it an obstacle to 
prosecute the crime of aggression. 
The successful prosecution of the first trials will arguably restore hope 
on the ICC’s work. Its success should not be measured by the delay in securing 
a first conviction, but the legitimacy of how it conducts its investigations and 
proceedings. 
 
PART VI: RECOMMENDATIONS 
The most important thing that the ICC has to do is to maintain its 
independence. This could be achieved through conducting its affairs in a 
manner that is purely judicial, objective, neutral and non-political. There is, 
thus, a need for it to expand its work beyond Africa. The advantage of an 
independent court is that the international community will have confidence in 
the entire work of the ICC. In the absence of this, the ICC will loose its 
credibility and become a place for settling political scores.  
All states should respect the ICC’s requests and respond promptly to its 
requests even if they are required to concede some loss of sovereignty. This 
will assists in eliminating safe havens for suspects. Where requests are ignored, 
suspects will walk free and victims will see the ICC as toothless. The court 
should also indict heads of states, particularly in Uganda and the DRC. This 
will arguably clear the current perception that leaders who make referrals of 
cases to the ICC immunize themselves and their cronies from prosecution. This 
would send out a clear message that there is no one above the law. The danger 
of apprehending heads of states may, however, bring more instability if the 
international community apprehends them from their sovereign countries.  
The international community should push for the United States of 
America, Russia, China and other countries to ratify the Rome Statute in order 
to increase global support for the Court. These countries play an important role 
as members of the UN, and are influential on Security Council resolutions that 
refer some of the cases to the ICC. Therefore, it is arguably unacceptable for a 
state that has not ratified the Rome Statute to vote on Security Council 
meetings regarding a matter to be referred to the ICC. Further, each state 
																																																								
339 Whiting, supra  note 27 at 323–24. 
208 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL, COMPARATIVE, & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 2011 
 208  
should ratify the ICC statute to ensure the ICC has independent and effective 
power to issue binding orders concerning matters falling within its jurisdiction. 
Having all states sign on to the Rome Statute will show a form of unity among 
the international community and collective commitment in upholding the rule 
of law. The absence of powerful countries in this collective effort arguably 
sends a message that the ICC was only established for small countries. 
 The victims have a perception that the ICC will solve all kinds of 
problems including the crimes committed prior to 2002. The court can only 
prosecute criminal acts committed after 2002. Accordingly, the court should 
increase its outreach programme to all the victims and the international 
community to pre-empt this misconception about its scope of prosecution. This 
will prevent a situation in which the international community has false 
expectations about the Court and gets disappointed in the end. The 
international community should condemn the conduct of the United States of 
America of entering into bilateral treaties with other countries regarding the 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Other lessons from the ICTY and the ICTR are that the court should 
consider making plea bargains with the low ranking officials in exchange for 
confessions and testimonies against ‘big fish’ and other accused persons. This 
will arguably speed up trials. The danger of such a system is that it is open to 
abuse. All suspects might end up seeking a plea bargain. The court should also 
not focus the lion’s share of its budget on one country by indicting all top 
suspects. The focus should be to prosecute those who bear the greatest criminal 
responsibility at the ICC and strengthen domestic courts to try low ranking 
officials and other high ranking officials if it is in the interest of justice to do 
so. 
Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute empowers the Assembly to establish 
an “independent” oversight mechanism for the ICC to ensure that the Court 
performs, inter alia, its functions effectively. In accordance with this 
provision, the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties appointed Mr. Akbar 
Khan (United Kingdom), with the task of establishing the aforesaid 
independent oversight mechanism at its fifth meeting, on December 4, 2008.340 
The ICC then circulated a non-paper which recommends that the oversight 
mechanism could be an expanded version of the Office of Internal Audit that 
will be administered by the Registry.341 This proposal has been met with 
concerns regarding the independence of the said mechanism.342 It is arguably 
premature to consider the introduction of an oversight body to the ICC. What 
will the enforcement agency do when many states have not ratified the Rome 
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Statute? Therefore, the aforesaid recommendations (including pressurizing 
other permanent members in the Security Council to ratify the Rome Statute) 
should be a higher priority than the proposed oversight mechanism. Working 
on the introduction of an enforcement mechanism at this early stage may, 
nonetheless, prove fruitful than considering the idea when the ICC is in dire 
need of an enforcement mechanism. 
The Security Council should play a more active and effective role, such 
as travel restrictions, economic sanctions and diplomatic sanctions on countries 
that provide a safe haven for suspects, refuse to arrest indictees, or cooperate 
with the ICC. The active role from the Security Council may be a problem 
because the Court is not a political body, but the Security Council is a political 
one. The active role of the Security Council on matters that fall within the ICC 
may thus compromise the Court’s independence.  
Today, the international community is speaking about a working court, 
with trials underway. There is also an emerging norm of customary 
international criminal law that international crimes cannot go unpunished 
regardless of the official position occupied by the perpetrator. State 
sovereignty, it seems, is no longer a justification to prevent the ICC from 
prosecuting those responsible for gross violations of human rights. 
Investigations are progressing in Kenya, the DRC, and Sudan. Three new 
suspects have been arrested and surrendered to the court. Therefore, the 
permanent International Criminal Court has, to a certain extent, been 
successful, despite the challenges surrounding it.  
 
